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HIGHLIGHTS 
• Informal settlements urban growth follows predictive models. 
• There are three identified stages of informal settlements development: Foundation, infill, and consolidation. 
• Organizational capacity grows as population increases, however, fragmentation weakens collective action 
capacity. 
• NSAA co-optation capacity increases as the neighborhood organizational capacity fragments. 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Scholars have vastly explored incremental growth of informal settlements as 
one of their defining features. Most of this work has focused on the family unit 
scale, concentrating on housing asset growth as related to the family historical 
narrative, legal status, social image, and financing. However, little has been 
explored about how this relates to the neighborhood scale and, more 
importantly, how the type of density growth impacts urban form, governance 
structures, and community social ties, which are essential elements for the 
development of resilient communities. Using semistructured interviews and 
historical mappings of informal settlements in Medellin, Colombia from the 
past four decades, this research maps the relationship between the urban 
growth of informal settlements and their impact on social networks. This 
research presents urban informality growth as following predictable patterns. 
It demonstrates that the exponential density growth found in these 
settlements, as they moved through the distinct phases of the predictive model, 
played a significant role in the fragmentation of social ties and co-optation by 
non-state Armed Actors, what I call eroded resilience. This finding raises 
important questions about the role of exponential density growth in 
connection with existing governance structures, not only in the context of 
urban informality but also in the context of global population growth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations define informal settlements as “areas where groups of housing units have been 
constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to, or occupy illegally; unplanned settlements 
and spaces where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations” (United 
Nations, 1997). Physically, a defining feature of the informal settlements is their haphazard urban fabric. 
This condition, that some describe as random and organic, is paradoxically the result of a very 
constricted set of rules of urban development created as part of the process of land taking in the context 
of limited resources. In other words, the random nature of buildings of informal settlements is the result 
of the process of building a shelter in a limited amount of time and with low economic resources outside 
of current legal and regulatory framework. This process of building under such conditions leaves 
dwellers with limited options of land occupation. Decisions such as where to locate and how much land 
a family takes are very similar from case to case. These individual choices create a very recognizable 
fractal pattern that can be visualized from aerial images of the settlements. New research on the physical 
form of informal settlement focuses on mapping and forecasting the growth of these recognizable urban 
forms (Augustijn-Beckers, Flacke, & Retsios, 2011; Mayunga, Coleman, & Zhang, 2007; Patel, Crooks, & 
Koizumi, 2012). Population growth mirrors informal settlement building densification. This process of 
densification, goes through three distinctive phases of progressive increase in population and number 
of housing units: foundation, infill and consolidation. Previous research on informal settlements has 
failed to observe these density generated changes that impact social, economic and physical 
relationships within the settlement.  
Collective action in land taking is a defining characteristic of an informal settlement. It is a key element 
necessary for successful land claiming efforts of informal communities. Over the lifespan of an informal 
settlement, collective action enables communities to reach agreements with state entities regarding 
provision of services (such as sewer, potable water, energy, communications, and trash collection). 
Regulation land claiming rights in the form of land tenure agreements and the provision of state 
programs like health, recreation and education is also facilitated through collective action.  
The resilience of an informal settlement can be measured by the success in community organizing. This 
capacity of self-governance is essential to challenge threats to the community from both internal and 
external forces. Informal settlement communities are by definition, effective collective action 
organizations; they need to be so to exist. As such, if they grow exponentially, the theory would predict 
that this growth would be reflected also in the ability to use the surplus of membership to increase 
effective collective action. 
However, the efforts of community action present challenges when occurring in the context of violence 
produced by Non-State Armed Actors (NSAA) within the communities. While the two phenomena of 
informal settlements and violent actors correlate, they do not imply causation. This coincidence reveals 
that informal areas are territories in which state institutions have less control and where para-state 
actors fill these vacuums of the state.  
The presence of violence vis-à-vis Non-State Armed Actors (NSAA) in informal settlements in Latin 
America is a recurrent theme in the literature about violence in the Americas. In the Latin American 
case, these community governance structures are co-opted by violent para-state organizations such as 
gangs and criminal franchises (Arias, 2004). Horizontal studies about informal settlements in Rio de 
Janiero find that over time a larger capacity of violent actors is detrimental to the development of favelas 
(Perlman, 2007, p. 228). However, these studies do not account for the important variable of 
densification change inherent in informal settlements as it relates to the process of self-governance and 
community action in the context of Non-State Armed Actors (NSAA).  
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This research focuses on answering the question: how does population change, as part of the growth of 
informal settlements, impact governance structures? A mixed method ethnographic approach provides 
insights about the evolution of community organizations in the context of urban informality and their 
relationships with the state and NSAA. This is presented alongside a quantitative mapping of urban 
growth, community organizations and NSAA’s evolution in three informal communities in Medellin, 
Colombia from their beginnings around the 1970s to the present during the stages of informal 
development. 
This research finds that in informal settlements, as communities densify, part of the process of urban 
consolidation and population arrival, the number of community organizations also grows. The 
densification process increases the number of services but challenges the overall community capacity 
for collective action. Alongside this process, NSAA follow a similar course: their number grows as the 
population expands and the varied number of groups creates space for violent competition and 
association with city and nation-wide non-state armed organizations. This inverse correlation of 
community governance and non-state organization capacity that is a result of the urban and population 
growth part of the process of informal settlement formation, facilitates the co-optation of the weakened 
self-governance structures within the informal settlement by non-state Armed Actors. This condition 
impedes the process of the community, collective action to claim rights to the state. At the same time, 
the increased capacity of control by NSAA, builds on the already contentious relationship between the 
state and informal settlement community. The resulting vacuum of governance then is occupied by these 
new violent para-states organizations. I call this inverse correlation between informal community 
capacity and NSAA by densification: eroded resilience.  
Control of informal settlement communities by NSAA is not new. What this research adds to other 
studies is the role of population growth and urban densification in the inverse correlation of community 
governance and NSAA capacity.  Here I find that at lower stages of the spectrum, when the self-
governance structures of these informal settlements are robust and capable of contesting the state, they 
are also more capable of managing and negotiating the criminal organizations.  This finding underscores 
the importance of building communities’ self-governance capacity as a way to create resilience in a 
context of violence by NSAA.  
2. POPULATION GROWTH IN THE CONTEXT OF GOVERNANCE VACUUM AND CONFLICT 
Rhetorically, people often make tacit linkages between the spaces of urban informality (“slums”), crime, 
and violence. This occurs in academic circles—as exemplified by the common fact that when researchers 
seek to understand urban crime and violence, they tend to study urban informal spaces; slums, favelas, 
barriadas, tugurios, comunas (Angarita, Gallo, & Jiménez, 2008; Arias, 2006; Arias & Rodrigues, 2006; 
Aricapa, 2005; Blake, 2013; Estrada C. & Gómez V., 1992; Franco, 2004; Koonings & Veenstra, 2007; 
Moser, 2004; Sánchez, Díaz, & Formisano, 2003; Wilding P., 2010). This representation also occurs in 
the media regarding the ways conflict and crime are framed (Amar, 2003). In many cases, the word 
favela (in Rio de Janeiro) or Comuna (in Medellín) denotes a place of both poverty and violent conflict. 
Since the 1960s, and especially since the 1990s, academics strongly emphasize the importance of not 
criminalizing the inhabitants of informal settlements, that is, to not reduce its people to poverty, 
violence, and criminality (Perlman 1976a; Turner 1977; Amar 2003; Civico 2012). Today, beyond a 
historical context of criminalization of the poor since the burgeoning of urban slums in the 18th- and 
19th-century cities, there is no clear understanding of why these 21st-century (informal) spaces are 
prone to this connection—both in the popular imagery and some cases, in actual practice—as in spaces 
in which the intersection of poverty and violence prevail. 
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It is clear that a direct correlation between conflict and informality does not inevitably exist (Muggah, 
2012, p. viii). Living in an informal settlement does not predetermine violent conflict. The types of 
criminal activity that happen in these physical spaces are in some cases no different from those that 
occur in the planned spaces of the city. What it is evident is that spaces of informality present challenges 
for official security actors (State) to assert and maintain their Westphalian monopoly of violence, a key 
feature of the foundation of the state, highlighted by Max Weber (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Santos, 2013), 
and thus the capacity to govern effectively. At the same time, informal settlements present advantages 
for NSAA to deploy and extort power and coercive force. 
 
2.1 Growth of informal settlements 
A staple theme in the literature on urban informality is the territories’ constant state of construction 
(Caldeira, 2000; Caminos, Turner, & Steffian, 1969; Greene & Rojas, 2010; Holston, 1991; Swilling, 
Tavener-Smith, Keller, von der Heyde, & Wessels, 2013; Turner, 1977; Ward, 1976). This change 
happens across various dimensions: population size and characteristics, housing quantity, and quality, 
and infrastructure. The existing literature focuses on issues of the self-built quality of informal 
settlements and describes them as unfinished in nature, and its growth as incremental. It tells us little 
about how communities develop in the context of these constant changes. Literature in urban 
informality focuses on the social implications of the “marginal” urban poor (Perlman, 1976, 2010; Roy, 
2005; Roy & AlSayyad, 2004; Soto & Instituto Libertad y Democracia, 1989). The sparse body of 
literature on the physical aspects of informal settlements focuses primarily on the housing units within 
these areas, rather than on the logic of the urban form (Ward, 2012; Williams, 2005). 
An emerging body of work explores the nature of growth within informal settlements, tied to the 
development of new mapping tools (Augustijn-Beckers et al., 2011; Blaschke, Lang, & Hay, 2008; 
Hofmann, Strobl, Blaschke, & Kux, 2008; Livengood & Kunte, 2012; Rüther, Martine, & Mtalo, 2002). In 
addition, the literature offers insight about the creation of predictive models to “successfully simulate 
the housing pattern of informal settlements growth”(Augustijn-Beckers et al., 2011). Further 
development of these models will permit the creation of predictions of how an informal settlement will 
grow (Beardsley & Werthmann, 2008; Patel et al., 2012; Sietchiping, 2008; Sobreira & Gomes, 2001, p. 
2). These new models permit mapping “slums” geometry in terms of urban growth changes in shape and 
size over time (Barros & Sobreira, 2002). A new term proposed for the process of mapping and 
forecasting informal settlements is “Slumulation” (Patel, 2012). These studies reveal the process behind 
observations of growth as occurring in defined phases. 
Current literature on informal settlements largely supports the idea that informal development follows 
a prescriptive series of stages (Augustijn-Beckers et al., 2011; Drummond, 1981; Rybczynski et al., 
1984).  In the Architectes des favelas, Didier Drummond studies the urban development of the favelas in 
Rio de Janeiro, finding that the informal settlements go through a series of phases of evolving 
consolidation. Phase one is “precarious implantation of shelters”; phase two is “transformation of 
shelters to sheds,” and phase three is “solid construction” (Drummond, 1981). In these three phases, 
Drummond reveals the very nonspontaneous mechanisms, in rather predictable and normative ways, 
in which these urban environments evolve though resident planning. In Medellín, Nora Elena Mesa 
Sánchez observes a series of stages of urban development within informal settlements. She comes to 
three phases similar to Drummond’s. However, she links housing improvements to the unit’s 
relationship with the overall urban form, which she defines as follows: “Stage 1, Poblamiento 
(populating): Allotment or subdivision, the moment of settlement behavior relative to the ground; Stage 
2, Edificación (Building): the volume, or three-dimensional aspect of the constructions of the buildings; 
Stage 3, Adecuación (adaptation): Consolidating and establishing relationships” between the physical 
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infrastructural networks (e.g. streets, transportation, public services) and between informal settlements 
and the city (Mesa Sánchez, 1985) My work on the patterns of growth in Medellin settlements presents 
the defining characteristics of each development stage in terms of the evolution of both physical and 
social organizations (Samper Escobar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology., & Department of Urban 
Studies and Planning., 2014).  It presents growth in informal settlements not only as physical and urban 
but also as contributing to the ways different actors relate to each other in the various stages. The stages 
of development are: (1) Foundation, (2) Infill, and (3) Consolidation (illustrated in Figure 1):  
 
1. Foundation: The first moment of occupation and erection of a group of homes, by a group or 
community of dwellers that act collectively. 
2. Infill: An increase in density and the eradication of open space between units as a result of the 
growth of existing units and the final use of open spaces left in-between units and the delineation in 
the final urban form of the public space. The population increase by the new density is mirrored by 
that of the collective groups. 
3. Consolidation: The final moment of integration with the urban form, at which point some informal 
settlements will become successfully integrated. Units’ quality improves, and most growth happens 
in the third dimension. Community organizations specialize into niches. 
 
Figure 1: Santo Domingo Savio. Stages of Informal Development. Source: Jota Samper 
2.2 Collective action, resilience, and informal settlements 
An important question emerges from this classification of informal settlement growth into phases: What 
role do these phases of change in the physical and social networks of the informal settlements have in 
the ways conflict happens there?  Janice Perlman in her seminal work "The Myth of Marginality" 
(Perlman, 1976) contradicts the literature of the time and builds on the emerging ideas of the 1970s 
regarding favelados (people who live in favelas) as an emerging entrepreneurial class. Her latest work 
"Favela" (Perlman, 2010) focuses on her original sample of interviews, revisiting her position after 40 
years. She now puts forth the disheartening proposition, that 40 years later those communities are in 
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fact marginalized. Perlman finds that there are noticeable differences between families who stayed in 
informal settlements and those who relocated to formal neighborhoods in state-sponsored projects 
(conjuntos and loteamientos). Her study claims that those who moved weathered better, in the sense 
that they have greater upward mobility and quality of life (measured by Perlman’s socioeconomic status 
index (SES) scores) than their informal settlement counterparts. According to Perlman, “the 
marginalization of the urban poor became a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Perlman, 2010, p. 333). Since 
Perlman measures a difference between two types of urban forms (formal versus informal), her findings 
pose a puzzling question in the context of the phases of development of informal settlements.  What is 
the role of urban space as a variable in what Perlman sees as different outcomes?  
I argue that Perlman and others who focus on conflict in areas of poverty and urban informality miss an 
important variable at the core of the definition of spaces of informality: that is, their state of constant 
urban change. They fail to account for the effects of changing urban form upon the social and criminal 
structures of the informal settlements. The important question then is this: What are the consequences 
of the ever-changing nature of informal settlements on the social organizations that operate within the 
informal settlements? I argue that Perlman’s conclusions do not account for two important variables, 
which are the basis of this research. First, informal settlements are always changing regarding 
population and physical form, so the quality of the buildings, units, and public realm changes greatly 
over a forty year period. Also, the increasing number of inhabitants should have an impact on the 
community’s abilities to pursue collective action. Second, the families Perlman was visiting now live, as 
she noticed, under conditions of violent conflict. This new condition greatly influences their capacity to 
generate weak and strong linkages and should also have an impact on the levels of marginalization of 
informal communities. Perlman found violence to be the single most distinguishing factor of favelas 
today versus those she mapped 40 years ago. However, she underscored the value of this variable of 
living under the pervasive coercion exerted by drug gangs as accounting for the present marginalization 
that her research finds.  
These two variables, which she did not account for, are the ones that influenced the results of her 
research. The constant urban change and conditions of violent conflict changed the structural situation 
of the informal settlement. Perlman’s study did not incorporate these changes in structural conditions 
because her focus was on surveying the socio-economic status of family households independent of the 
urban form and its social organizations. 
Collective action is a necessary feature in land taking for an informal settlement what make it a key 
defining characteristic of what an informal settlement is. This process can be read as an act of 
insurrection against the status quo, be it a neoliberal capitalist system under a weak nation regime. This 
act of insurrection in the land taking context becomes a claim of these communities of their “right to the 
city” (Lefebvre, 1996), in which citizens take control of the production of space. Informal settlements 
then, are the embodiments of Prucell’s reading of Lefebvre’s ideas, “a radical vision for a city in which 
users manage urban space for themselves, beyond the control of both the state and capitalism” (Purcell, 
2014). Stepping out of the supervision of the state and capitalism creates parallel institutions of 
governance within these spaces, what James Holston articulates in the process of building the city in the 
poor peripheries of Brazil as “insurgent citizenship” (Holston, 2008).  
This capacity of self-governance is essential to challenge dangers both from within and external to the 
community. The literature that focuses on community organizing against evictions, places importance 
on the role of community linkages to local and external actors, as correlated with the success of stopping 
external attacks like evictions (Gans, 1962; Granovetter, 1973). Furthermore, the value of community 
organizing and participation are important as tools to overcome the struggles for permanence of 
marginalized communities (Skuse & Cousins, 2007; Viratkapan & Perera, 2006). Regarding growth, 
traditional Collective Action theory tells us that as the organization grows this change presents 
challenges to its ability to engage in effective collective action (Olson, 1971). A body of theory challenges 
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this notion, demonstrating a correlation between larger organized groups and successful collective 
action (Oliver & Marwell, 1988). When looking at externalities, large population groups have a surplus 
of resources that help them more easily organize collective action to achieve their goals (Agrawal, 2000).   
Informal settlement communities are by definition small, effective collective action organizations; they 
need to be to exist. As such, if they grow exponentially we should expect that growth to be reflected in 
the ability to use the surplus of membership for more effective collective action. However, this effort of 
community action presents challenges when it happens in the context of violence produced by Non-
State Armed Actors (NSAA) within the communities. In the Latin American case, these community 
governance structures get co-opted by violent para-state organizations like gangs and criminal 
franchises (Arias, 2004). Horizontal studies about informal settlements in Rio de Janiero find that 
overtime larger capacity of violent actors is detrimental to the development of favelas (Perlman, 2010). 
However, these studies do not account for the important variable of population and densification change 
inherent in informal settlements as it relates to this process of self-governance and community action 
in the context of non-state Armed Actors.                                                    
Literature in social disorganization explores the relationship of community members’ social ties in ways 
that are spatially bound and the influence of these ties on crime (Bellair, 1997). Changes in 
neighborhood ecological structures can strongly influence levels of social control, social ties, and 
collective efficacy (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).  Social ties here are considered an appropriate indicator of 
crime levels. An inverse correlation between social ties and fear implies that as social ties breakdown, 
there is more fear and this itself correlates with higher levels of crime (Taylor, Gottfredson, & Brower, 
1984). Social ties are fundamental to the foundation of informal neighborhoods. These ties and the close 
interdependence of community members allows them to claim ownership of land.  
In the context of urban violence in which informal communities live, what becomes important is their 
capacity to be resilient against NSAA in the absence of state protection. Social physiology defines 
resilience as “attainment of desirable social outcomes and emotional adjustment, despite exposure to 
considerable risk”. Resilience is then a response to psychosocial adversity or events considered 
stressing enough to hinder normal functioning (Luthar, 1993; Masten, 1994; Rutter, 2001). In the 
context of urban violence, Diane Davis defines resilience “as those acts intended to restore or create 
effective functioning community-level activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetuators of 
violence are marginalized and perhaps even eliminated” (Davis, 2012, p. 32).  Davis further unpacks the 
concept of resilience in the context of urban conflict as positive or negative:  
 
“Positive resilience is a condition of relative stability and even tranquility in areas intermittently 
beset by violence. Strong, cooperative relationships between the state and community, and 
between different actors—businesses, civil society, the police, etc.—tend to characterize 
positive resilience. Negative resilience occurs when violence entrepreneurs have gained 
effective control of the means of coercion, and impose their own forms of justice, security, and 
livelihoods. In such situations—most frequently in informal neighborhoods where property 
rights are vague or contested—the community is fragmented and seized by a sense of 
powerlessness, and the state is absent or corrupted” (Davis, 2012, p. 35) 
 
Since informal communities depend in their self-governance structures more than on state institutions, 
it is the strength of those local institutions that relies the capacity of these communities to stop the acts 
of the perpetuators of violence, and thus its ability of collective action becomes a measure of its 
resilience capacity.  A question that emerges here is what role the stages of urban development in 
informal settlements play in the strength and configuration of social ties? In other words, what effect 
does growth have on informal settlement social relationships, crime and the capacity for resilience 
against those violent acts? 
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3. MEASURING URBAN DENSITY CHANGE AS DETERMINANT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
NSAA CO-OPTATION. 
This research looks at community self-governance evolution through time as it relates to the 
community’s changes in density (population/buildings) and to the levels of violent conflict. To answer 
these questions, this research uses a mixed-methods approach in two parts: an ethnographic approach 
to understand the evolution of community organizations in the context of urban informality and its 
relationships with state and non-state actors; and a quantitative mapping of urban growth and 
community organizations and NSAA evolution in three informal communities from their foundation to 
the present.  
I chose the city of Medellin as a key case in the literature on the intersection of informal settlements and 
criminal control by non-state Armed Actors. Medellin informal settlements have been controlled by a 
myriad of criminal organizations for over 40 years. Medellin, the once most violent city in the world, has 
navigated over the past 40 years four types of NSAA that have taken siege of its informal settlements, 
accounting for up to 40% of its territory (Samper Escobar et al., 2014) 
I examine three informal neighborhoods (Independencias, Santo Domingo, El Triunfo) that share similar 
characteristics: being founded more than 30 years ago and having been controlled by NSAA. Medellin’s 
informal communities are an “extreme case or a unique case” (Yin, 2009) of informal settlement and 
criminal control. The unit of analysis is the informal settlements of Medellin from 1968 to 2012. 
Specifically, this research concentrates on three neighborhoods in three districts (comunas) of Medellin 
as embedded units (comunas: 1, 8 and 13). These embedded units were selected following the same 
criteria for the selection of the city of Medellin. They represent the areas of the city with the highest 
levels of informality and transformation over time with longer and more varied forms of urban conflict: 
Comuna 1: Santo Domingo Savio, Comuna 13: Independencias 1 and 2 and Comuna 6: El Triunfo. Also, 
these neighborhoods are selected because detailed accounts of their histories exist. Four other 
neighborhoods were included as control cases using a variation of the “N of One plus Some” research 
technique of secondary cases that are used “to identify issues to expect, questions to ask, and data to 
look for in the primary case[s]” (Mukhija, 2010). These other neighborhoods are Nueva Jerusalem in 
Bello, Comuna 8: El Pinar, Comuna 13: Antonio Narino and Comuna 6: El Picacho. See table 1 for a 
description of the selected areas. 
Three type of sources are identified in this research. Below is a description of each one of them and how 
they participated in the study. Data about community stories regarding building the city of Medellin 
come from 472 interviews conducted as part of “Medellin my Home”, a historical memory project in 
collaboration between three U.S. universities and founders and residents of informal communities in 
Medellin (2009-2015). The interviews include stories from the three areas of study as well as other 
areas of the city with conflict and informality. This group was randomly selected from a pool of 45,000 
families considered by the city of Medellin to be living in the lowest poverty bracket in the city. 
Interviews have been conducted by Duke University, MIT, Emerson College and Lesley University 
students who were trained by the author and project’s co-founder and co-director Tamera Marko, and 
were video recorded. In this ongoing project, we have more than 6000 hours of video interviews with 
more than 520 families to date. To compensate for the potential bias of this population, the author 
conducted other random community interviews in the areas of study with community members not 
belonging to this database. These groups of individuals were selected through snowballing (Bertaux & 
Bertaux-Wiame, 1981), starting with access to neighborhoods at two points. The first group is composed 
of individuals recommended by the social worker’s team of the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano EDU and 
Planning Department. The other group is drawn from community groups or NGO’s in the selected 
embedded units of analysis (Comunas). By having these two-entry points, this study seeks to overcome 
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some of the bias that having only one would introduce.  These narratives provide the basis for measuring 
the capacity of informal communities collective action.  
Table 1: Research neighborhoods  
Neighborhood Base 
year 
Type Area 
(Ha) 
** 
Pop 
(2002) 
Fiscal 
lots to 
titling 
Units 
** 
*** 
Estrato 
Social strata 
Unit/
ha 
** 
People 
Per 
unit 
   ***  *  1 2 3 ***  
El Triunfo 1980 Invasion 11.71 3,439 101 1,135 1,081 54 0 219 4.48 
Santo Domingo 1963 Invasion 56.13 18,890 2,394 6,645 1,625 5020 0 118.3 4.19 
Independencias 1980 Invasion 25.42 14,460 1,109 4,553 4,373 180 0 179.1 3,17 
Villatina 1960 Invasion
/other 
40.66 10,619 1,395 
4,286 1,781 2,505 0 105.4 4.5 
Picacho 1977 Invasion 41.77 13,010 - 4,245 2,313 1,658 4 95.4 4.43 
Antonio Nariño 1970 Pirata 39.39 12,336 - 4,488 615 3,496 377 113.9 2.74 
Source: *Secretaria de Hacienda, contratos: 4600019122 de 2008, **Municipio de Medellín. Viviendas residenciales estratificadas 
por comuna y barrio según estrato, 2010 ***Alcaldía de Medellín. Plan Estratégico Comuna 6 2006–2015: La Comuna 6-Doce de 
Octubre un territorio para vivir dignamente, (2009) 
 
Interviews with state officials include professional experts who have participated in the planning, 
execution, or evaluation of the project in informal settlements. This also includes the publications and 
interviews of the academics whose work analyzes projects in informal settlements or urban conflict in 
Medellin. I have interviewed 25 individuals who fit into this category, including two mayors, planning 
directors and planners whose work and opinions have had (and, in many cases, still have) a direct 
influence in the three selected embedded units (Comunas). And finally, interviewed armed actors 
present and formally part of NSAA. This group is smaller than the others, and access to the members 
represents the greatest challenge in this project. One entry point is the large portion of re-integrated 
illegal armed actors who are part of community organizations (that protect them) and also of state 
projects that support the reintegration process. The second entry point is through a network of 
community members, state officials, and project managers who deal in the day-to-day activities with an 
active member of illegal armed groups. I have conducted 10 interviews with members of this category. 
 Growth of the informal settlements over time in this study is understood as a relationship of population 
growth and building growth. Since informal settlements growth is not mapped, I needed to draw new 
historical maps of the city of Medellin to see this change. his was done by geocoding historical aerial 
images found in the Department of Planning in the City of Medellin. I erased new buildings by reference 
to the aerial images and created a new map for each one of the time periods where aerial images were 
found. This was one of the most time-consuming parts of the study: this constituted a base Cartography 
for spatial analysis involving the construction of maps that show growth at parcel scale of the six 
neighborhoods studied here. Mapping required site visits to corroborate states surveys, collecting and 
georeferencing historical aerial photography, and the painstaking labor of checking and drawing a map 
of each building in the neighborhood for each of the identified periods. Research maps are also informed 
by archival research in the Planning Department databases and other entities, including university 
libraries and research groups, newspapers and historical maps, crime data repositories, review of 
historical memory projects historical archival material, and then superimposed with the collected 
historic aerial photography (1950- 2013). The resulting maps of the six neighborhoods distributed 
along the phases of informal development provided the base for a measure of urban density change that 
was corroborated when possible with census data or community mappings. 
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4. INFORMAL SETTLEMENT GROWTH AND COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES  
 
Table 2: Comparative of three neighborhoods. Santo Domingo Savio, El Triunfo and 
Independencias. 
    Stage 1   Stage 2    Stage 3      
    Foundation 
 
Infill 
 
Consolidation   Area/ha 
El Triunfo  
     
 
11.7 
 Build Area 1,050 
 29,739  41,331   
 Units 25 
 564  1,135 ****  
 Population 113 
 2,540  3,998 ***  
 Density 2.1 
 48.2  97   
 time 1982-1989 
 1992-2001  2001-2014   
  
Number of Buildings 25 (1983)   1,121   1,506   
  
Santo Domingo  
  
   
 
16.2 
 Build Area 19,168 
 55,385  78,605   
 Units 5-500 
 2,383  4,885   
 Population 3,500 * 10,490 
 21,505 **  
 Density 30.8 
 147  301.5   
 time 1959-1969 
 1992-2001  2001-2014   
  
Number of Buildings 541 (1969)   2,915 (1994)   3,671 (2013)   
  
Independencias   
 
   
 
17.2 
 Build Area 3,159 
 81,346  199,009   
 Units 50 
 4,157  6,996   
 Population 225 
 11,222  18,887   
 Density 2.9 
 241.7  406.7   
 time 1970-1989 
 1989-1999  1999-2014   
  
Number of Buildings 50 (1972)   3,633 (1989)   4,294 (2013)   
  
 
Each of these cases (informal settlements) follows the stages of informal development (see table 2). 
Looking at the data on these neighborhoods, transitions between stages can be characterized as 
follows; from stage 1 to stage 2, there is the largest population growth. Most neighborhoods grow 3 
to 20 times their size in population, depending on the timeframe used (beginning of land taking to 
end of period). In most cases, for every founding member, 20 more people will arrive at the 
neighborhood. This radical change in neighborhood composition has profound effects on the 
performance and composition of neighborhood social networks. Also, land coverage changes 
significantly, as much as 30 times the original area coverage. This second period is characterized by 
the transition from a rural model, in which open space is the predominant feature, to an urban model 
where open space is restricted and defined by the buildings. From stage 2 to 3, population grows 
between two to three times and then halts. Most building growth happens in height during this 
phase.  At this juncture, there is an increase of land coverage but not as radical as in the previous 
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stage, up to two times more than in the previous stage. Final densities are between 200 to 400 
units/hectare.
 
 
Figure 2: Social organizations’ growth per informal stage. Source: the author’s interviews 
and the Alcaldia de Medellin PB info 2010. 
 
Informal settlements exponential growth from the moment of foundation to a plateau around the 
consolidation stage has profound effects on relationships among inhabitants (social ties, alliances, 
community management, economy, etc.), and on the organizations, that engage in the space of the 
informal settlement.  These changes can be summarized as follows: urban growth and population 
density (1) increase the number of members, but it also increases and (2) fragments the number of 
possible social organizations. As these phenomena occur, it creates an opportunity for (3) specialized 
and clustered social organizations within the community.  
 
1. Increased numbers of residents: Foundational moments require a relatively small quantity of 
members, from 25 to 100 families. The number of community members increases tenfold (or more 
depending on the case) within the first years of informal settlement development. In the informal 
settlement of Independencias, for example, for each founding member there are now 83 new ones 
(see Table 2). Examining the ties of informal communities by their propinquity explains the extent 
in which existing members are able to establish new social ties. The exponential growth between 
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stages of informal development implies that as the neighborhood grows it becomes unfeasible to 
know everyone in the network. 
 
2. Increased number of Social Organizations: In the first stages, there is a single group, possibly two, 
including the church as a key organizational structure in Colombian informal settlements (like in the 
case of Santo Domingo Savio or Moscu ) (Calvo Isaza & Mayra, 2012), but as time passes the number 
of organizations grows at the same rate as the population. Growth over time opens the opportunity 
to create new social organizations. In the foundational stage, a single group (usually a Junta Accion 
Comunal or an informal group that will fulfill its functions) accomplishes all communitarian needs 
(social gatherings, housing, infrastructure provision and negotiations with state actors). As the 
neighborhoods grow, new organizations appear and take functions away from the founding 
organization or add new functions. An example of such growth and diversification is Comuna 1; here 
there are 16 types of registered social organizations currently participating and competing for the 
participatory budget (PB), ten times more typologies of organizations and 30 to 40 times more 
unique organizations (see Figure 2). Another characteristic of this growth in communitarian 
organizations is that they become specialized in the type of services provided.  
 
3. Specialization: the increasing numbers of organizations is also reflected in the variety of interests 
and areas of work of each one of those organizations. There is then not one single group that has to 
coordinate all community projects. Instead there are myriad typologies of interests that represent 
specializations of those interests. For example, some of the typologies of social organizations that 
participate in the PB of the Comuna 13 are: communal associations and groups that each represent 
the interests of youth, women, the elderly, community mothers, housing, cooperatives, religious 
interests (now more than just Catholic), NGOs, parent associations, the environment, ethnicities, 
sports clubs and LBGT communities. Political groups are excluded from the Participatory Budget 
(PB), but they are also present in these areas. Figure 2 maps the growth of these organizations within 
Comuna 1.  Moreover, it shows how time and urban growth play a major role in this fragmentation 
and specialization. The fragmentation of community organizations continues, now each one of those 
organizations specializes and become more sophisticated. In Comuna 13 (Independencias) there are 
now youth organizations that use the arts as tools for peace such as“Casa Morada.” This organization 
is an NGO operated by community members with ties to and funds from multiple state and non-state 
resources. They have a state of the art studio and teach hip-hop alongside art classes on graffiti 
(Comuna 13 style). In Comuna 8 (Villatina) the community planning council is developing a 
community plan for Comuna 8 that competes against the city “greenbelt plan.”  
5. MAPPING INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS GROWTH AND VIOLENT CONFLICT  
Exponential population growth affects community organizations, eroding and fragmenting social ties 
which in turn weakens social structures that previously had greater capacity to hold violent actors at 
bay. On the other hand, this growth increases market opportunities, both for legal and illegal activities, 
which along with the increase in the numbers of violent actors, permits their integration into violent 
social organizations. The violent groups perceive the non-violent groups (such as community 
associations) in the informal settlements as their enemies. The three phases of informal development 
represent not only physical and social evolution moments, but also mark important changes in the way 
conflict happens inside informal settlements.  
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Stage 1: Foundation. The reduced number of community members and the interdependence necessary 
to survive creates a very tight group that provides some level of protection against the also reduced 
number of perverse actors. Low opportunities for rent also creates a disincentive for other organizations 
to profit from dwellers at this stage.  
Stage 2: Infill. The high number of new residents overwhelm the capacity of community organizations. 
New market opportunities appear at this stage like small stores. The increased number of dwellers 
opens opportunities for a myriad of possibilities for association, among those are associations through 
crime. The larger number of dwellers challenges community social ties that were key at the community’s 
foundational moment, fragmenting the community into multiple groups with different affiliations. This 
opens space for newly formed gangs to act. Gangs tend to be local and tied to the neighborhood territory. 
Infilling creates irregular spaces and paths of movement, providing an advantage to those who know 
the territory. 
Stage 3: Consolidation.  As commerce and density grow hand in hand, the market opportunities for 
illegal profit increase and the competition for those new revenues creates violent conflict. Large Non-
State Armed Groups take place in informal settlements and profit from outsourcing their violence and 
turf control to the ever-changing small gangs in informal settlements which continue to control local 
territories made accessible and defendable by their intimate local knowledge of the space.    
Below I explain in more detail the differences in conflict at these stages of development.   
 
5,1 Stage 1: Foundation 
Across the interviews, community members talked about this period as an idyllic period of time in which 
armed actors were not present, a provocative finding.  Initial interpretation of these reports suggests 
that time had colored the memories of such critical foundational moments, some up to 40 years in the 
past – painting a better picture of life than actually existed and removing situations of conflict in a typical 
case of what in psychology calls “false memories” (DePrince, Allard, Oh, & Freyd, 2004). A more detailed 
look at the interview descriptions revealed a plausible explanation for the consistency in people’s 
memories of this period. Around 20% of the large pool of interviews included foundational stories and 
30% of the semi-structured interviews. All narratives follow the same pattern: in the beginning, 
criminals existed but not the kind of criminal organizations that would arrive later. Even though 
perverse actors existed, they did not act in groups and were less threatening. The enemy during this 
period was not NSAA; the enemies were landowners and state actors like police or army which act with 
a myriad of institutions (military, police, and municipal non-security institutions). These actors and 
institutions arrive to evict families, tear down structures, arrest community members, and burn houses.  
As an example, the police evicted a family and destroyed their house twenty times in the Moravia 
neighborhood. Such stories do not include illegal armed actors; community members replay over and 
over saying “they arrived later.”  
The explanation for such a puzzling phenomenon I argue is as follows: at the foundational moment, 
successful communities (those that we can interview now and have achieved permanence over time) 
are a small and very tight group of 50 families or so, as shown by the cases in this study. They depend 
on each other to survive. They ally to fight common enemies; to build necessary infrastructure such as 
paths, streets, sewers, and energy connections; to build their own houses; to take care of family 
members, etc. In Medellin residents of informal settlements called these meetings to build “convites” 
(literally meaning “invites”, a gathering of community members to achieve a single goal. This can be a 
public project, like a road paving, or the construction of a sewer line or a private goal like building a roof 
for a family house).  Most founders know each other intimately.  Interviewees could recount the full 
name of each of the families that constructed their neighborhood. This tight-fitting society does not leave 
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space for competing social organizations, even criminal ones. Nor are there sufficient members to create 
competing organizations in the neighborhood, including criminal organizations.   
5.2 Stage 2: Infill  
At this stage, population growth is the most salient feature. As explained previously, the increases of the 
population are on the order of 10 or more times greater than the foundational moment. Community 
organizations growth mirrors population growth, which also includes organized criminal groups in the 
form of street gangs. At this stage violence shifts from being perpetrated by state security institutions 
or specific individuals to these new local gang organizations. 
Along with the population increase, there is a reduction on the number of “convites,” as core 
infrastructural needs are filled. At this point, the main goals of community action are accomplished; such 
goals as the widening of streets, creating access to clean water, and electricity. These new improvements 
are brought both by communities and the state, or in some cases a combination of both, like the case of 
electricity provision in Independencies. Two things then happen simultaneously: (1) those services that 
for all neighborhoods are essential for their survival (like water provision) are being supplied and (2), 
population growth makes it more difficult to coalesce the community towards a single goal. A 
community member mentioned that the sense of “union is lost.” In discussing this period, interviewees 
lose their grasp on understanding the entire social network of the neighborhood; they cannot recall the 
names all members who live in the community. The cohesive social network of the foundational stage 
fragments, multiple community organizations start challenging the hegemonic power of the Juntas de 
Accion Comunal (JAC) Neighborhood Association, and there is competition for resources through 
different political networks, or through the same pool of resources. In Comuna 13, for example, the JAC 
as an organization has been more connected to the traditional parties while new youth organizations 
such as Siglo XXI acquire their support initially thru NGOs and non-traditional political parties. Later in 
2008 they competed for the same pool of money during the participatory budget (PB).  This type of 
competition further foments fragmentation. This fragmentation per se is not necessary for the detriment 
of the community. Heterogeneous voices and interests are good for governance. The problem there is 
the absence of a framework in which multiple voices can negotiate and organize to solve the new set of 
issues that growth brings to the community. Two important issues are how to deal with the new 
association among lines of crime and how to manage security issues. 
Among those new organizations are also perverse organizations; the first gangs appear at this stage 
(infill). Community members belittle the power of these groups. When compared with the next stage 
(consolidation), expressions like “los pelados [those youth] that fight among them” are used by 
community members when describing these first criminal organizations in the neighborhoods. The 
opportunity of a racket market encourages competing gangs to use violence to capture illegal tax 
incomes. The fragmentation of a cohesive social structure enables gangs that increase in sophistication 
to control and supplant the now fragile community social organizations.  
Interviewees connect changes in the type of conflict with an escalation of violence as the result of 
newcomers. They connected new types of organizations with groups that arrived. “When those [name 
of the criminal organization] people arrived.” At first this could be attributed to a way to distinguish 
themselves from criminals: we are not like “them” kind of response. However, even when talking with 
ex-members of the conflict, arriving individuals and groups are mentioned as one of the sources of 
escalation of conflict at this stage and the next one (consolidation). An ex-member of a gang in Villatina, 
talked about the arrival of the “negroes” (Urabeños).  He mentions how this new arrival intensified 
conflict and how the conflict was not like that before the advent of such a group.  
While some new organizations bring with them new members from other areas. It is clear that existing 
residents also become part of new organizations. So the argument that all of this change came from 
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outside does not hold true. The gangs at this scale are small and not very sophisticated. Also, the types 
of weapons that they use and their strategies to control territory are very primitive. Community 
members know the names of the participants of the groups and also their mothers. In Manantiales de 
Paz, Bello, an informal settlement at stage two, it is through these family ties that community groups 
establish a dialogue with the gang leaders. This closeness means that at this stage perpetrators of 
violence are local.  However, fragmentation as part of the violence of the gangs makes some community 
members feel that the perpetrators are coming from the outside. This proximity would change in the 
following stage where outsiders as criminal organizations clearly arrived.  
During this stage, the network of streets and spaces becomes very tight, and houses packed in at a higher 
density. The proportion between what is public and private changes. The reduced surface area of streets 
impedes the mobility of community members. Lack of mobility makes territorial control by armed 
groups easier. The first lockdowns appear at this stage. Impromptu checkpoints at strategic places are 
a way to secure protection of turf. In El Triunfo, the first turf battle will be followed by the installation 
of those checkpoints at the “entrances” on the bordering streets. This phenomenon, today called 
“invisible borders”, is present all over the city. These practices become more systematized in the next 
stage of development. 
5.3 Stage 3: Consolidation 
 
 
Figure 3: Neighborhood EL Triunfo (at stage 3) type of constructions Source: Plan Estrategico 
Comuna 6 2006-2015 Construyendo Ciudad (100) 
Commerce and density grow hand in hand. As market opportunities for illegal profit increase, 
competition creates violent conflict. Large Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG) take place in informal 
settlements and profit from outsourcing their violence and turf control to the ever-changing small gangs 
in informal settlements.   
In this final stage, density continues to increase two-to three-fold. It is also a period where house 
improvements include aesthetic considerations that demonstrate better incomes of some dwellers from 
other periods. James Holston in Brazil connects this process of façade decoration in informal settings to 
dwellers meeting their class aspirations by decoration styles and materials of new owner upgraded 
structures (Holston, 1991). In the neighborhood, El Triunfo for example seventy-seven percent of homes 
are made of a solid construction and have some type of decorative exterior vs. three percent that present 
some fragile material construction (see figure 3). The unit’s appearances are in some way a reflection of 
the possibility of having disposable income for some dwellers.  
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Figure 4: Map of clustering of homicides 2001 – 2009 (in red) and locations of communitarian 
organizations (in green) in the Comuna 8. This map reveal how community 
organizations and gangs intersect in a context of measured violence. Is in this spatial 
intersection that co-optation emerges. Source: SISC, JAL Comuna 8 and Jota Samper 
 
Commerce growth reflects this revenue increase at the interior of the dwelling. Interviews compare the 
lack of commerce options of the previous stage to the copious number of commerce establishments and 
the variety of services increasingly available. “Twenty years ago, there were no more than fifteen stores, 
today there are more than one hundred” (716). The Empresa de Desarrolo Urbano EDU estimates 
business grow up to three hundred percent between 2003 to 2008 in Santo Domingo Savio 
neighborhood (Samper Escobar, 2010). Also, the investment in units at this point is a reflection of 
security, as evictions by the state, or private actors are improbable. 
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The flipside of the economic success of the neighborhoods is that the economic and organizational 
growth is mirrored by similar developments with the perverse organizations. Economic growth creates 
new markets for racketing opportunities to the existing and new gangs. New bus lines were met with 
demands for taxation to gangs in Comuna 13. Competition to include those market opportunities 
generates conflict and space for more violence among warring gangs. In Independencias, control over 
taxation of commerce at the entrance to the two neighborhoods is motive for armed confrontation 
between “Los del Dos” and “Los del Uno” as narrated by one of the ex-members of one of the groups. Drug 
distribution and the protection of places of drug sale (plazas de vicio) are new objectives for gangs.  
The gangs also follow the organization specialization and sophistication present in the existing 
community organizations. Gangs select market niches within the crime market, such as gangs 
specialized in for-hire assassinations (which in Medellín is are called sicarios).  This period sees local 
gangs affiliated or violently absorbed by large criminal organizations like the Milicias, Paramilitares, 
Oficinas, or specific drug lords. An example of such a process is the "Groupos de Vigilancia y Seguridad 
Privada (convivir)" in 1995, which later became part of the ACU and then gangs (combos) by 2001 
(Angarita et al., 2008)(Angarita, Gallo, and Jiménez 2008). The connection with those organizations that 
operate at a larger scale brings sophisticated urban warfare techniques and armament. Upgrades in 
armament and training make gangs more efficient in reproducing violence. However, the connection of 
gangs with larger organizations is quite fragile, measured by the loose coalitions that form and reform 
within neighborhoods, resulting in the ever-changing nature of the franchises of organized crime in 
Medellin. Large franchises and small neighborhood gang relationships are fragile, measured by the lines 
of communication between them. In Medellin, in 2012, two drug lords fought for the control of 
Medellin’s drug market: Alias 'Sebastián' against Alias 'Valenciano' in the vacuum left by alias “Don 
Berna” in the Oficina de Envigado. Gangs would affiliate with one or the other capo and would only sell 
products (drugs) from one of the providers. For obvious reasons big “capos” (drug lords) do not visit 
the neighborhoods very often and, if they are seen, their presence is narrated more as a fascinating myth 
than a landlord overseeing his property. A key local person is dedicated to communications with the 
larger organization that supplies money, drugs, and jobs. Most of the members of the local gangs do not 
get to meet with the intermediaries. 
Higher density leads to a paradoxical phenomenon of territorial control.  With each level (of housing 
above existing units) added to the neighborhoods, the battlespace becomes more tridimensional 
(multiple build levels) and more complex.  With the added complexity of the environment, the ability of 
local gangs to control territory diminishes thus their domains become smaller. The small gangs provide 
little competition to older and more organized criminal organizations, but they are fundamental to such 
organizations for the distribution and transference of power to the scale of the street. Finally, at this 
stage, state and neighborhood relationships change. Informal settlements at consolidation stage are 
tough to demolish, and more services of the state arrive. Is at this stage that municipal governments 
implement upgrading projects.   
6.  ERODED RESILIENCE AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENT GROWTH: THE NEXUS BETWEEN 
VIOLENT CONFLICT SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ITS RELATION TO STATE POWER. 
This research presents conflict in informal settlements evolving as correlated with population growth 
and indirectly correlated with self-governance capacity. The relationship between local community 
capacity and NSAA control is enabled by the lack of capacity of state institutions to monitor those 
informal areas. Each stage of development presents different capacities for each one of these groups and 
learning of this variation presents a more nuanced perspective on the complex relationships at the core 
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of informal settlements. This condition of increased action capacity of NSAA from the reduction of 
collective action effectiveness of governance institutions in informal settlements I call Eroded 
Resilience. At earlier stages positive resilience can be found but as the neighborhood densifies negative 
resilience prevails. Table 3 puts into context how community governance, NSAA control, and state 
interaction evolve over these stages of development.  
Table 3: Eroding resilience, State, NSAA and Community evolving over the three stages of informal 
growth. 
 
Stage FOUNDATION: INFILL: CONSOLIDATION: 
Actor    
STATE 
Municipal 
government, 
planning offices, 
and policing 
The enemy: The state as 
protecting private and public 
property, attempts to control 
settlement in the area, through 
the process of evictions. These 
evictions are violent acts. 
Given that population 
continues increasing violence 
increases with each 
succession. At this stage, 
evictions are a common 
phenomenon.  
Disenfranchised:  After losing 
the battle to claim the rights of the 
land appropriated by informal 
dwellers, the state organizations 
enter into a gray area of action. 
Without tools to evict the 
community or tools that permit 
them to increase the quality of life 
in these places, inaction is the 
only route of action. This leaves 
space for others to fulfill para-
state functions, chief among those 
of security.  
 
Arrival: After decades of state 
inaction. The increase density 
make the prospect of state 
evictions impracticable.  This 
impracticability opens political 
and legal opportunities for state 
action. At this stage, the state 
arrives with the main provision of 
services. However, at the same 
time high and entrenched para-
state actors challenge state police 
forces action.  
NSAA 
Individual 
criminal, gangs, 
organized crime 
franchises 
Individual: criminal actors 
coexist among community 
members, they act alone, and 
their actions do not challenge 
the new power structures 
within the community. 
The small gang: increasing 
population creates an 
opportunity for new forms of 
association, including associating 
by crime. This period sees the 
foundation of the first gangs. 
Multiple gangs and franchises 
of crime: consolidation of the 
urban form, more density, a 
heterogenization of incomes, and 
proliferation of economic 
activities presenting new taxation 
opportunities for larger criminal 
organizations. 
 
COMMUNITY 
 
Cohesive group: A requisite 
to succeed in the land claiming 
effort is the effective collective 
action led by a strong 
leadership. It is at this time 
that the community efforts are 
at their best. A single group 
manages all community needs.  
Specialization of functions: 
Increased numbers of dwellers 
incentivizes the creation of new 
groups that fulfill specialized 
functions (water, recreation, 
education, and building). Multiple 
organizations compete for 
resources, among those is 
competition for violent control by 
the new gangs.  
Endanger and atomized group 
action:  High density, the 
proliferation of community 
agencies that compete for 
resources, and undermining of 
the capacity of action of the 
community. Also, violent non-
state actors. Reduced ability of 
the community for successful 
collective action. 
Source: Jota Samper 
Growth modifies the social ties of community members and has adverse effects on security levels in 
informal neighborhoods. Social ties change in the following ways: (1) an increase in the number of 
community members requires a more complex community organizational system; (2) the 
specializations of social organizations’ motivations also include those of perverse (illegal armed actors) 
organizations; and (3) the population growth gets confounded with fear, intensifying the cycle of 
decreasing social ties, which in turn increases levels of fear and crime. These three features are the key 
elements that configure the eroding resilience. 
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1. The complex organizational structure needed: As the population grows, the same system that 
permitted the organization of the community to do their projects became more complex to control. 
The sheer quantity of members makes this exercise more difficult, competition between community 
leaders become fiercer as larger numbers of leaders appear. These changes are no different to other 
organization growth challenges, but in this context, the scale of increase along with the lack of an 
external (state or otherwise) support for such process makes effective governance more complex. 
As a result, a single community organization is unachievable. 
2. Perverse organizations mirror specialization of social organizations: I argue that with the 
exponential growth of dwellers comes an increase of community members who participate in crime. 
Opportunities for association by participation in crime then appear. This type of association also 
becomes more specialized as time passes, following the same process of the other social 
organizations in later stages of development. As the neighborhood grows, the type of criminal 
activity and the type of violence that those groups execute is different and more specialized. In Stage 
1 (Foundation), theft is the most common crime. All interviewees attested to this.  At this stage, there 
is no mention of the presence of illegal armed actors as organizations within the informal settlement. 
In Stage 2 (Infill), gangs appear, for the first time. These groups are very local and do not have an 
association with larger groups (drug lords, Milicias, Paramilitares or Bacrim). In Stage 3 
(Consolidation), neighborhood gangs establish connections with the most sophisticated criminal 
organizations and franchises. Informal territories offer economic, political, or strategic benefit for 
those organizations. The criminal franchises outsource, training or eliminating local gangs as a way 
to acquire control of the territory. Interviewees associated with gangs seem to have no problem 
switching from working for one type of (criminal) franchise to another. Those who do have a 
problem with this kind of switching of groups (or sometimes even sides) do not survive the 
transitions.  
3. Population growth reinforces fear and declining social ties:  In the interviews, every new threat to 
the security of the neighborhood appears to arrive from outside of the informal settlement. 
Repeatedly, the interviewees use the theme “‘they’ arrived” to refer to ways than an NSAA is acting 
in the territory (gangs, Milicias, Paramilitares, Bacrim). This arriving condition of armed actors 
creates confusion because most illegal armed actors live in these informal communities. In other 
words, the actors whom day to day use violence in the neighborhoods are indeed community 
members by definition. External groups that perpetuate violence also arrive from other places. The 
case of the Paramilitares groups taking Comuna 13 is a good example here. Most of the leaders of 
such groups arrived from other places and located in the neighborhood, sometimes in the same 
houses that the Micilias members occupied. However, in most places, gang structures are 
reconfigured (by killing or expelling a significant number of their members) to serve the new 
criminal organization structure. During the transition from Milicia to Bloque Metro (BM) in Comuna 
8 in 2002, members of Milicia and competing Paramilitares groups joined the BM once it had 
acquired control of the city and entered into the DDR (Disarming Demobilization and Reintegration) 
process. This phenomenon is depicted in the documentary film “La Sierra” (Dalton & Martinez, 
2005). Here it is argued that most of that process of the arrival of illegal armed actors is part of the 
population growth and that, from the perspective of the dwellers, it seems like foreigners coming to 
their neighborhoods.  In reality, it is a mix of old members and new members arriving and creating 
new associations, some criminal, some not. These new arrivals and new organizations create a new 
pool of actors within the space of the informal settlement. Moreover, the community members 
already living there often must choose which groups to align with, leave or risk losing their 
livelihoods or worse, their lives. This violence that produces displacement is a form of social 
engineering performed by the criminal groups. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Control of informal settlement communities by NSAA is not new. However, this research adds to the 
many other studies of this relationship the inverse correlation of community governance and non-state 
Armed Actor capacity. It shows that at lower stages of the spectrum when the self-governance structures 
of these informal settlements are robust and capable of challenging the state they are also more capable 
of managing and negotiating those criminal organizations, what I call eroding resiliance.  This finding 
underscores the importance of building community self-governance capacity as a way to create 
resilience in a context of violence by Non-State Armed Actors.  
Arun Agrawal concludes that small groups can “increase their performance” if there are government 
incentives to collaborate. However, “if groups are dispersed this prevented coordination of resource 
management” (Agrawal, 2000, p. 79). Violent groups in informal settlements provide an environment 
where these small clustered and specialized groups are isolated. Preventing ways in which to capitalize 
from its surplus on membership is a way to successfully coalesce into collective action.  In Medellin, the 
case of the of the Mesa de Derechos Humanos de la comuna 6 shows that incentives to collaboration 
among community groups that coexist in a context of violence “produce higher levels of resilience in the 
context of violent actors” (Samper, 2012).  This research presents changes in density as a relevant 
variable in the capacity of organizations to engage with criminal actors. It sees undermining the ability 
of self-governance of these communities and its collective action as detrimental to community security. 
This finding is vital not only in the context of urban informality but also in the context of global 
population growth and asymmetrical urban warfare. 
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